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ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL: TWO-AND-A-
HALF WAYS TO DESTROY INDIAN LAW 
Marcia Zug* 
In December 2011, Judge Malphrus of the South Carolina family court 
ordered Matt and Melanie Capobianco to relinquish custody of Veronica, 
their two-year-old, adopted daughter, to her biological father, Dusten 
Brown.1 A federal statute known as the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(“ICWA”)2 mandated Veronica’s return.  However, the court’s decision to 
return Veronica pursuant to this law incited national outrage and strident 
calls for the Act’s repeal.3 While this outrage was misplaced, it may 
nonetheless have influenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to hear the 
appeal. The case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl is emotionally 
complicated, but it is not legally complex. Therefore, the Court’s interest is 
surprising and likely means that this case will determine more than the fate 
of a single child. 
The court returned Veronica Capobianco to her biological father 
because the termination of his parental rights and the subsequent adoption 
attempt did not comply with the requirements of ICWA. South Carolina law 
would have permitted the involuntary termination of Brown’s parental 
rights, but ICWA supersedes state law and forbids such involuntary 
terminations. Consequently, because Brown never relinquished his rights, 
the family court held that Veronica was not eligible for adoption and that she 
must be returned to Brown. The South Carolina Supreme Court 
subsequently affirmed this decision. The court agreed that under the clear 
 
         * Marcia Zug is an associate professor of law at the University of South Carolina 
School of Law. She would like to thank her colleague Professor Tommy Crocker for his 
invaluable assistance with this essay. 
 1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 550, 556 (S.C. 2012) cert. granted, 
No. 12-399 (Jan. 4, 2013); Allyson Bird, Broken Home: The Save Veronica Story, 
Charleston City Paper, Sept. 26, 2012, available at 
http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523. 
 2. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified in 
scattered sections of 25 and 43 U.S.C.). 
 3. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 1; Veronica May Not Be Saved, ABC News 4 (July 26, 
2012, 6:20 PM EST), http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved 
(last updated July 27, 2012, 2:16 AM); Anderson Cooper 360°: Baby Veronica’s Story (CNN 
television broadcast Feb. 21, 2012); Dr. Phil: Adoption Controversy: Battle over Baby 
Veronica (NBC television broadcast Oct. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdWzeOzdhaw. 
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language of the Act, Brown qualified as a “parent” and that the termination 
of his parental rights must comply with ICWA.4 
According to the grant of certiorari, the Baby Girl Court will address 
two questions: “(1) [w]hether a non-custodial parent can invoke ICWA to 
block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent 
under state law[;]” and “(2) [w]hether ICWA defines ‘parent’ in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with 
state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.”5 These questions are strange 
because they have already been answered, and the answer to both is clearly 
yes. The Supreme Court addressed the first question in Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw v. Holyfield, in which the Supreme Court held that ICWA could 
block an adoption voluntarily initiated by a parent under state law.6 The 
clear language of ICWA answers the second question by specifically 
defining a “parent” as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child.”7 
Therefore, given that the issues presented by this case are not in dispute, it is 
likely that the Court intends to address a different question in Baby Girl. 
Some suggest that the Court may have granted certiorari to determine 
whether ICWA applies to children, like Veronica, who have never been part 
of an Indian family; however, this is unlikely given that this question has 
also been resolved.8 The 1982 Supreme Court of Kansas case In re the 
Adoption of Baby Boy L first raised the issue of ICWA’s applicability to 
Indian children removed from non-Indian homes.9 In Baby Boy L, the 
Kansas court became the first of many to adopt an exception to ICWA for 
cases in which the “Indian child” had never been part of an Indian home.10 
This doctrine became known as the “existing Indian family exception.” After 
Kansas, a number of other states also adopted this exception, and for a time, 
this doctrine created a significant circuit split. However, there is now almost 
unanimous agreement that the existing Indian family exception violates the 
clear purpose of ICWA.11 
 
 4. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d at 550. 
 5. Questions Presented at 1, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, cert granted (Jan. 4, 2013) 
(No. 12-399), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/12-00399qp.pdf (last visited Mar. 
3, 2013). 
 6. 490 U.S. 30, 42–54 (1989). 
 7. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Take Case on Adoption of Indian Child, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 4, 2013, at A11, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/us/supreme-court-takes-
case-on-adoption-of-indian-child.html?_r=0 (“Some lower courts have said the law kicks in 
only if the adoption breaks up an existing Indian family . . . .”). 
 9. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
 10. Id. at 206. 
 11. See, infra text accompanying notes 13–17 (noting that the exception is only 
recognized in seven states, two with limited application.); see also Dan Lewerenz & Padraic 
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Congress enacted ICWA to ensure the survival of Indian tribes by 
removing Indian family issues from state control after concluding that 
abusive state practices had created an “Indian child welfare crisis.”12 The 
existing Indian family exception directly subverts this goal by giving states, 
rather than tribes, the power to determine who is an Indian child. Now, 
nearly all states, including Kansas, recognize this problem with the existing 
Indian family exception and view the exception as erroneous.13 
Seven states currently recognize the doctrine, but two of these states 
have expressly limited its application. It has been explicitly rejected by 
nineteen states, including five since 2000.14 Consequently, given that the 
Court had three decades to address a split that is now rapidly disappearing 
without its intervention, it seems highly unlikely that the Court accepted the 
appeal to suddenly recognize the existing Indian family exception. Instead, 
the Court’s decision to hear Baby Girl most likely signifies that at least some 
members of the Court wish to re-examine the constitutionality of the entire 
Act—and maybe even all of Indian law. 
In a recent Charlie Rose interview regarding Baby Girl, Justice Scalia 
hinted at these broader implications when he described his decision to join 
the majority in Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield as the biggest 
 
McCoy, The End of “Existing Indian Family” Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of 
A.J.S. and the Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 684, 690 (2010) 
(describing the doctrine as “little more than a troublesome footnote in a handful of states”). 
 12. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978) (“[In some states] the risk run by Indian 
children of being separated from their parents is nearly 1,600 percent greater than it [was] for 
non-Indian children.”). The House report suggested several reasons states could be responsible 
for this disparity, including the 
fundamental misunderstanding by state officials of the importance of extended families in 
child-rearing within tribal communities[,] . . . the economic incentive for child placement 
agencies to remove children, basic racial discrimination, . . .  [or unwillingness] to 
recognize the value of direct “parent”-like relationships between an Indian child and his 
or her extended family or larger tribal community. 
Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 11, at 691 n.49 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 10–
12). 
 13. Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 11, at 686–88 (noting that three other states that 
had also initially accepted the doctrine—Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington—have 
now rejected it, and no new states have accepted the doctrine in over a decade). 
 14. Brief in Opposition at 16–19, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, cert granted (Jan. 4, 
2013) (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 5994979, at *16–*19, available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/scac/Adoptive_Couple.BIO.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 
2013). But see, Dawn M. v. Nev. State Div. of Child & Family Servs. (In re N.J.), 125 Nev. 
835, 848 (2009) (adopting the doctrine on a case-by-case basis and applying it in that case only 
because neither the Indian father nor the tribe objected to the adoption). 
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regret of his career.15 Holyfield is the Court’s sole ICWA case, and it 
concerned the adoption of twin Indian children by a non-Indian couple. In 
Holyfield, the Court held that the voluntary placement of the children by 
their Indian parents violated ICWA. Although the twins were born off the 
reservation, they were still domiciliaries of the reservation, and, as a result, 
the Court found that ICWA gave the tribe exclusive jurisdiction over their 
adoption.16 
The Holyfield case answers the first question presented by Baby Girl 
and makes it clear that ICWA can block an adoption voluntarily initiated by 
a parent under state law. Scalia’s statement nevertheless indicates that the 
Court may have decided to hear Baby Girl in order to overturn Holyfield. 
The difficulty with using Baby Girl for this purpose is that Baby Girl 
involves a different provision of ICWA. Both Holyfield and Baby Girl 
concern an Indian child placed in a non-Indian adoptive home, but only 
Holyfield raises the issue of tribal jurisdiction.17 Veronica was born off 
reservation to a non-Indian mother, and thus, exclusive tribal jurisdiction is 
not an issue in Baby Girl. Because the two cases involve very different 
provisions of ICWA, the most likely way for Baby Girl to overturn Holyfield 
is if the Court were to find the entirety of ICWA unconstitutional. 
The constitutionality of ICWA is based on two propositions: First, these 
special laws for Indians are not race based. And second, Congress has the 
authority to issue special laws with regard to Indian people and tribes. If the 
Baby Girl Court rejected either of these positions, not only would ICWA be 
unconstitutional, most of Indian law would fall as well. 
There is no question that ICWA treats Indian children differently than 
non-Indian children. Nevertheless, under well-settled law, this distinction is 
not constitutionally problematic. In Morton v. Mancari, the Court explained 
that “Indian” is a political affiliation rather than a racial category.18 It is 
uncertain whether the Roberts Court would agree with this distinction. The 
Roberts Court has indicated its strong disapproval of racial preferences, 
stating, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”19 The Court could reach a similar 
 
 15. Adam Liptak, Case Pits Adoptive Parents Against Tribal Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
24, 2012, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/us/american-indian-adoption-case-
comes-to-supreme-court.html. 
 16. Miss. Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48–54 (1989). 
 17. The Holyfield Court held that under ICWA’s jurisdictional provisions, an Indian 
mother domiciled on the reservation could not avoid tribal jurisdiction by giving birth off the 
reservation.  Id. 
 18. 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (describing the preference as one granted to “quasi-
sovereign tribal entities” as opposed to a racial group). 
 19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007). 
ZUG MLR FI FTP (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2013  12:45 PM 
50 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 111:46 
 
 
conclusion regarding ICWA in Baby Girl. But if the Court were to do so, 
this holding would not only destroy ICWA but it would almost completely 
eliminate existing Indian law. 
As the Court explained in Mancari, “Literally every piece of legislation 
dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single out for special 
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations.”20 
The Court went even further, saying, “If these laws, derived from historical 
relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed 
invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the 
Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”21 
Similarly, if the Court were to find that ICWA is unconstitutional 
because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, 
the impact of this decision on Indian tribes would be just as devastating.22 
The Indian Commerce Clause states, “[T]he Congress shall have 
Power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among several 
States, and with the Indian tribes.”23 In 1790, Congress used this provision to 
enact the first Trade and Intercourse Act, which included provisions 
regulating crimes on Indian lands.24 Since then, it has been understood that 
Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause is broad and extends 
far beyond a narrow definition of commerce.25 
During the one hundred years before Congress enacted ICWA, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed the idea that congressional power over 
 
 20. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Congress attempted to hedge its bet when it described its authority for issuing the 
Act as both the Indian Commerce Clause and “other constitutional authority.” This authority 
includes “statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes . . . .” 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1901(2). However, it is clear the main authority for the Act rests on the Indian Commerce 
Clause. 
 23. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 24. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137–38 (1790); see also Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery 
Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and 
Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28 Vt. L. Rev. 713, 725 (2004) 
(“Congress exercised that constitutional authority when it enacted the First Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790 . . . . “). 
 25. As Professor Akil Reed Amar notes, 
none of the leading clausebound advocates of a narrow economic reading of ‘commerce’ 
has come to grips with the basic inadequacy of their reading as applied to Indian tribes, or 
has squarely confronted the originalist implications of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, 
in which the First Congress plainly regulated noneconomic intercourse with Indian tribes. 
America’s Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 Yale L.J. 
1997, 2004 n.25 (2006). 
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Indian affairs was plenary.26 This remains the current understanding. The test 
for whether the Indian Commerce Clause authorizes an act of Congress is 
simply whether that statute “can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians.”27 Given this low 
threshold, it seems indisputable that ICWA—which Congress passed to 
prevent the breakup of Indian families, ensure the transmission of Indian 
culture and heritage, and prevent the extinction of Indian tribes—meets this 
test. 
The two possibilities detailed above are the worst-case scenarios. They 
outline the ways in which the Court could use Baby Girl to essentially 
destroy not only ICWA but also the majority of Indian law. Such a course of 
action would be both legally and politically problematic. Either holding 
would require the Court to blatantly disregard history and precedent, and 
could further entrench the widely held belief that motivations other than law 
increasingly influence the Court. Journalist Dahlia Lithwick made this point 
last spring with regard to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) when she argued 
that the constitutionality of the Act would not prevent the Court from 
“strik[ing] it down anyway.”28 Lithwick predicted that “70 years of 
precedent [and the justices’] own prior writings on federal power” would be 
irrelevant to the decision.29 According to Lithwick, the decision would 
simply come down to “optics, politics and public opinion.”30 
Lithwick was not alone in holding this view of the Court’s 
decisionmaking process, and in the end, it may have been the Chief Justice’s 
desire to change this perception that determined the fate of the ACA. 
Although many reporters and pundits were surprised when Roberts joined 
the majority and upheld the Act, others explained this move as the result of 
Roberts’s unwillingness to contribute to the image of the Court that 
commentators such as Lithwick presented. According to Jonathan Chait of 
New York, “Striking down the law at this moment would have brought the 
Court to a tipping point at which Roberts’s political opponents, at least, 
 
 26. During this period, the Supreme Court never struck down any Indian legislation as 
exceeding congressional authority. See William Bradford, “Another Such Victory and We Are 
Undone”: A Call to an American Indian Declaration of Independence, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 71, 
81 n.58 (2004) (“[N]o congressional exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs has 
ever been set aside by the courts, with the exception of Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 
(1987), which declared specific statutory escheat provisions a taking as applied to Indian land 
and thus constitutionally invalid under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 27. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
 28. Dahlia Lithwick, It’s Not About the Law, Stupid, Slate (Mar. 22, 2012, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/03/the_supreme_court_is
_more_concerned_with_the_politics_of_the_health_care_debate_than_the_law_.html. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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would afford him no legitimacy at all as the ‘umpire’ he promised to be in 
his confirmation hearings. He stared into that abyss and recoiled.”31 The 
Economist made a similar point about the Roberts decision, stating, “Mr 
Roberts genuinely thinks continuity, stability, public approval, and a posture 
of deference to the legislature are crucial to the healthy functioning of the 
judicial branch.”32 
Such legitimacy concerns could also influence the Baby Girl decision. 
The Court may be reluctant to issue an opinion that overturns centuries of 
precedent and threatens to invalidate the majority of Indian law.33 Instead, 
the Court may look for a more limited means of invalidating ICWA, and this 
would likely prompt a decision based on the Tenth Amendment. Invalidating 
ICWA under the Tenth Amendment would permit the Court to affirm 
Congress’s broad power to enact Indian legislation but would carve out an 
exception for situations where such legislation creates a significant 
infringement on states’ rights. Such a decision would invariably appeal to 
justices such as Justice Thomas, who has already indicated that he sees 
substantial Tenth Amendment concerns with much of Indian law.34 The fact 
that concerns regarding ICWA and the Tenth Amendment are not new 
bolsters the likelihood of the Court using this approach. 
At the time of ICWA’s enactment, the Department of Justice suggested 
that the Act’s application to off-reservation children could violate the Tenth 
Amendment. Specifically, the DOJ questioned whether 
Congress ha[d] power to control the incidents of child custody litigation 
involving nonreservation Indian children and parents pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause sufficient to override the significant state interest in 
 
 31. Jonathan Chait, John Roberts Saves Us All, New York, (June 28, 2012, 11:33 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/06/john-roberts-saves-us-all.html. 
 32. W.W., John Roberts’s Art of War, The Economist, (June 28, 2012, 21:01), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/06/obamacare-and-supreme-
court-0. 
 33. It should be noted, however, that the pro-ICWA factions are most likely much 
smaller and certainly less powerful than the pro-ACA groups. 
 34. For example, in Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, Justice 
Thomas used the Tenth Amendment–type argument to increase state power over Indian tribes. 
524 U.S. 103 (1998). Thomas began with “the principle that state taxation of Indians on 
reservations is not authorized unless Congress ‘has made its intention to do so unmistakably 
clear,’ ” and transformed it “into the principle that when Congress makes Indian land freely 
alienable, it is ‘unmistakably clear’ that Congress intends that land to be taxable by state and 
local governments, unless a contrary intent is ‘clearly manifested.’ ” Alexander Tallchief 
Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the Reservation Borders, 12 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 1003, 1016 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ZUG MLR FI FTP  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2013  12:45 PM 
April 2013] Two-and-a-Half Ways to Destroy Indian Law 53 
regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising 
jurisdiction over what is traditionally a state matter.
35
 
After considering this issue, the House of Representatives concluded that it 
had the authority to enact ICWA and explained that Congress could “impose 
certain procedural burdens upon state courts in order to protect the 
substantive rights of Indian children, Indian parents, and Indian tribes in 
state court proceedings for child custody.”36 
In addition, the House further supported its argument that ICWA was a 
valid exercise of congressional authority with the observation that although 
domestic relations is an area of historic state control, ICWA does not oust 
the state from this historic role. Instead, the Act simply reinforces the right 
of tribes to define their members. The House’s conclusions are still correct 
today. Although domestic relations is one of the core areas of state authority, 
this traditional power has never extended to Indian family relations.37 If the 
Court chooses to invalidate ICWA on the basis of the Tenth Amendment, it 
will need to address this domestic relations argument. Moreover, it will need 
to explain how these Tenth Amendment concerns justify an unquestionable 
infringement on tribal sovereignty. 
A Tenth Amendment argument raises many legal difficulties, but if the 
Court is able to overcome these hurdles and hold that states have the right to 
apply state family law in cases involving Indian families, then it is possible 
that Baby Girl will turn out to be the first in a line of cases permitting the 
invalidation of federal Indian laws based on concerns regarding states’ 
rights. Numerous areas of Indian law raise states’ rights concerns, and it is 
easy to imagine how courts could apply such a holding to other areas of 
state–tribal conflict, such as criminal law or taxation. States have long 
objected to the idea that they are powerless to control a group of people and 
lands located within their borders, and many would welcome the opportunity 
to increase their jurisdiction over Indians. Consequently, the potential 
implications of this case are much greater than the fate of a single child. 
Apart from intervening to affirm the “existing family exception,” there 
are no non-far-reaching rulings that will return Veronica to her adoptive 
parents. The Court will either have to undermine significant portions of 
federal Indian law as race based, curtail Congress’s Indian Commerce 
 
 35. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978). 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. The purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause was to eliminate the possibility of state 
power over Indian affairs. Absent a grant from Congress, states have no authority in this area. 
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (“If anything, the Indian 
Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal 
Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that 
the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually 
all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.”). 
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Clause power with far-reaching consequences, or embrace a Tenth 
Amendment limitation on the reach of Indian law that cuts a broad swath 
through many existing laws. Therefore, regardless of whatever might have 
motivated the Court to take this appeal, there is no good option but to affirm 
the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to return Veronica to her 
father. 
